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Abstract: This paper challenges the common narrative that Heidegger’s philosophical project 
explicitly and necessarily abandons his early engagement with Dilthey after Being and Time. By 
historically piecing together Heidegger’s critiques of Dilthey throughout his corpus alongside 
significant shifts in his use of terms like Erlebnis (“lived experience”) and Faktizität 
(“facticity”), I demonstrate continuity rather than a radical split in his relation to Dilthey’s 
philosophy. This interpretation offers a new perspective that works against the periodization of 
Heidegger’s thought by highlighting the overlooked relevance of his early engagement with 
Dilthey for his later turn to art.  
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There is little doubt that Dilthey’s philosophy was influential in the development of Heidegger’s 
thought, especially his early lecture courses and Being and Time. In 1924, Heidegger drafted an 
article entitled “The Concept of Time: Comments on the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence” for the 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte. The article was a 
review of the published collection of letters between Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck von 
Wartenburg. While the article was not published in the journal, the manuscript became one of the 
sources for Being and Time. Gadamer described “The Concept of Time” as the Ur-form of Being 
and Time, and scholars now refer to this manuscript as “The Dilthey Draft.”1 Heidegger includes 
entire passages from this unpublished article in Being and Time and even asserts that his analysis 
of Dasein “is resolved to foster the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey’s work.”2 
Heidegger himself describes Being and Time as an appropriation (Aneignung) of Dilthey, which 
has significant meaning insofar as this term has the sense of retrieving something from the past 
that has potential for the present and future.  
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 Beyond this passage in Being and Time, the magnitude of Dilthey’s role in Heidegger’s 
philosophical development preceding his magnum opus has come to light only in the past twenty 
years as a number of his early lecture courses from the Gesamtausgabe have been published and 
translated.3 Scholars have used these early lecture courses to study how Heidegger’s 
appropriation of Dilthey forms the questions that guide his early work and informs his 
philosophical method. Among these scholars, Scharff claims that we have failed to appropriate 
Heidegger’s thought fully because we have not developed an adequate account of his relation to 
Dilthey. Drawing from Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures, Scharff presents a provocative 
argument that Dilthey was even more important to the young Heidegger than Husserl and that 
“the Dilthey appropriation taught the young Heidegger how to philosophize.”4 In this sense, 
Heidegger does not treat Dilthey as simply one philosophical influence among others, but rather 
models his own way of philosophizing after Dilthey.  
 Despite the critical role Dilthey plays in Heidegger’s thought in the decade before Being 
and Time, this appropriation is considered to end some time around its publication. The typical 
narrative is that Heidegger’s attitude towards Dilthey appears to shift in the late 1920s and early 
30s when his positive references to Dilthey taper off and only criticism regarding his 
philosophical limits remains. This period of Heidegger’s philosophical development, known as 
his ‘turn’ (Kehre), seems to indicate an intellectual break with Dilthey. At this time, Heidegger 
critiques Dilthey for being immured in traditional philosophical language and for rejecting 
metaphysics, which sets up an epistemological framework centered on a Cartesian ‘I.’ In 
Einleitung in die Philosophie (1928), Heidegger accuses Dilthey of privileging presence and 
objectivity, an indication that his philosophy operates within a Cartesian framework.5 Heidegger 
develops this critique further when he explains that the Cartesian subject precludes the 
possibility of philosophy by rejecting metaphysics, which reshapes philosophy into a mere 
anthropology. In his later essay “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), Heidegger argues that 
Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics illustrates “a leading example of anthropology’s doing away 
with—as opposed to overcoming—philosophy” (GA 5:99/OBT 75).6 In his Black Notebooks 
(1931–38), Heidegger names Dilthey as one of the “three ambient ‘temptations’” that Being and 
Time was unable to master in trying to achieve its goals and tasks (GA 94:104/BN 57).7 This 
passage suggests that thinking with Dilthey, whom Heidegger groups with Kierkegaard under the 
category existentiell, limited his efforts to articulate the question of being. The notebooks as a 
whole assert Heidegger’s efforts to begin philosophy anew by turning to ancient Greek 
philosophy rather than figures in the tradition of German philosophy (GA 94:37/BN 24). In 
doing so, he appears to discard Dilthey. Additionally, Heidegger’s lectures on art and poetry in 
the 1930s and 40s malign aesthetic theories based on lived experience (Erlebnis), which seems to 
be aimed at Dilthey and his major aesthetic work, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung. For these 
reasons, scholars treat Heidegger’s relation to Dilthey as a passing phase that is a part of his early 
development and irrelevant to his middle and late work after the Kehre.  
 Yet this narrative is not so simple when examined in greater detail. Heidegger’s earlier 
works that celebrate Dilthey’s philosophical insights make similar comments about the 
philosopher’s “Cartesian” epistemological framework and the apparent anthropological aspects 
of his philosophical method.8 While Heidegger’s praise of Dilthey clearly diminishes starting in 
the late 1920s, his criticism of Dilthey remains the same throughout his corpus. The continuity in 
Heidegger’s early and late critiques of Dilthey suggests that he did not suddenly reject this 
thinker at a certain point in his intellectual development and complicates the task of interpreting 
the appropriation.  More importantly, Heidegger’s early critiques of Dilthey focus on his failure 
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to do justice to his most promising insights because his methods remain too ingrained in 
traditional philosophical language. For Heidegger, the originality of Dilthey’s insights demands a 
new approach to philosophy to which he only gestures. Heidegger thus critiques Dilthey’s 
language and methods, not his central insights and guiding questions. In this sense, the 
appropriation aims to carry forward Dilthey’s most promising ideas by radicalizing his 
philosophical methods and adopting new language.  
 In what follows, I argue not only that there is no clear and necessary break with Dilthey 
in Heidegger’s philosophical development, but also that there is common ground between these 
thinkers well beyond Being and Time. The first claim challenges a long assumed narrative, while 
the second constructs a new one. Both parts of my argument are important for giving an account 
of the appropriation that expands upon Dilthey’s relevance, rather than confining him to narrow 
historical or philosophical interpretations.  
 In the first section, I demonstrate how Heidegger’s apparent rejection of Dilthey rests on 
confusion over the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung, which are both terms for 
experience.  Specifically, I trace Heidegger’s early use of Erlebnis in the 1920s and later 
rejection of it in the 1930s to demonstrate continuity in his concept of experience, rather than a 
fundamental revision as his changing terminology seems to suggest. In the second section, I give 
an account of early Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey through the concept of facticity. 
‘Facticity’ (Faktizität) describes what is given in lived experience. Despite being ‘given,’ 
facticity presents a particular challenge for philosophy because it describes the need to articulate 
our concrete, lived experience in ways that are not abstract or reductive. Facticity calls for new 
modes of concept-formation, which Dilthey develops through his aesthetic theory. While 
Heidegger does not turn to aesthetics in his early engagement with Dilthey and factical life, my 
third section argues that his later turn to art reflects the same concerns. In this way, I will go 
beyond Heidegger’s explicit appropriation of Dilthey to draw new connections both between the 
thinkers and within Heidegger’s corpus as a whole. 
           
 
1. Reevaluating the Erlebnis-Erfahrung Distinction 
 
One way to examine Heidegger’s relation to Dilthey is the Erlebnis-Erfahrung distinction. Both 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung can be translated into English as ‘experience,’ yet they have different 
meanings and usage. The root of Erfahrung (fahren) means “to drive,” “go,” or “move,” and has 
the sense of engaging with something and gaining knowledge or information through experience. 
This term is used most frequently in the natural sciences. Erfahrung frequently describes a more 
neutral type of experience, whereas Erlebnis (from the verb leben, ‘to live’) conveys a more 
intense or immersive experience. While some translators distinguish between these terms by 
translating Erlebnis as ‘lived experience,’ the differences between these two terms are frequently 
lost in English translations and require more context to understand.9 To complicate matters 
further, multiple nineteenth and twentieth-century German philosophers—including Hegel, 
Benjamin, and Husserl—ascribed finer, more technical distinctions to each term and debated 
their connotations and proper usage. Heidegger’s use of the Erlebnis-Erfahrung distinction 
proves to be even more complicated, especially when read in relation to Dilthey.      
 Erlebnis is central to Dilthey’s philosophy, and early Heidegger’s use of the term reflects 
Dilthey’s influence. However, Heidegger eventually maligns the term—with which he associates 
all the philosophical ideas his thought attempts to overcome—and adopts Erfahrung instead. Due 
to the clear association between Dilthey and the term Erlebnis, scholars frame Heidegger’s break 
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from Dilthey in terms of this shift in language. Understanding whether or not this critique of 
Erlebnis forms an explicit and necessary break from Dilthey means understanding how each 
thinker uses the term and the connotations they evoke in their use of it. In this section I will 
argue that Heidegger’s use of Erlebnis undergoes such significant revisions that we cannot treat 
the term as an interpretative fulcrum for his break from Dilthey. The following will address 
Dilthey’s understanding of Erlebnis and then trace Heidegger’s use of the term from 1919 to 
1939 to demonstrate how much it changes. 
 
 
1.1. The Erfahrung-Erlebnis Distinction in Dilthey’s Philosophy 
 
Dilthey adopted the term Erlebnis in his philosophy to signal a particular approach to thinking 
that characterizes the human sciences and differs from the methods of the natural sciences. While 
the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) attempt to explain phenomena that are objective or 
follow lawful patterns, the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) cannot adopt the same 
methods because their subject—Geist, or human spirit—resists objectivity and lawfulness. 
Instead, the human sciences attempt to understand (verstehen) what cannot be fully explained 
(erklären). While both sciences examine experience, they approach it differently. The natural 
sciences assume a distant, reflective stance apart from its object of empirical study. By contrast, 
the human sciences are necessarily self-reflective and immersed in the very experiences they 
attempt to examine, which are contextual and continually changing. This distinction is why 
Dilthey adopts the term Erlebnis to convey the temporal and relational dynamism of lived 
experience in opposition to the more objective concept of experience conveyed by Erfahrung, 
which is the term used by the natural sciences and Kantian epistemology. For Dilthey, lived 
experience is historical—a complex, dynamic, and changing set of relations that cannot be 
reduced to the explanatory framework of the natural sciences. Unlike the experience of an object 
as distinct and separate from oneself, as Erfahrung suggests, Erlebnis conveys a sense of living 
through something—that is, a living perspective that changes over time.  
 Dilthey’s adoption of Erlebnis relates to his attempt to revise Kantian epistemology. As 
Makkreel explains, Kant’s use of Erfahrung treats experience as “a conceptual ordering of inert 
sensations” so that the basis for experience is not itself an experience, but instead raw material to 
be synthesized.10 Kant’s Erfahrung is a “phenomenal construct” of synthesized sensory input, 
whereas for Dilthey “the basic unit of consciousness is already experiential, namely, an 
Erlebnis.”11 In his unpublished notes Fragments for a Poetics (1907–1908) Dilthey states that a 
“lived experience is a distinctive and characteristic mode in which reality is there-for-me. A 
lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or represented” (GS 6:313/SW 
V.223).12 Dilthey’s use of Erlebnis emphasizes its lived aspect insofar as experience is there-for-
me, meaning I am entangled in the world of experience, I live through it and in it, rather than the 
world being represented to me through experience.  
 Here it is important to note that Dilthey’s concept of lived experience is not Cartesian, as 
Heidegger and his followers have suggested. In Truth and Method, Gadamer claims that 
Dilthey’s description of lived experience as there-for-me indicates an ego-centric Cartesian 
epistemological framework that requires everything be rooted in the subject.13 Yet Dilthey’s 
concept of there-for-me actually challenges Cartesian subjectivity because it describes a pre-
theoretical unity between subject and object that is prior to any sense of an ‘I.’14 For Dilthey, the 
individual is not a disembodied ego but instead emerges only in relation to the world. Before we 
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even differentiate ourselves from the world, we possess what Dilthey calls “reflexive awareness” 
(Innewerden).15 Dilthey develops an account of reflexive awareness in his “Breslau Draft” 
(1880) of the second volume to his Introduction to the Human Sciences. Dilthey refers to 
reflexive awareness as “being-for-oneself, life” and describes it as an immediate state of 
awareness in which “the subject is not at all separated from what is perceived” (GS 19:160/SW 
I.339). Reflexive awareness is the dynamic mode of relation that precedes the recognition of 
subjects and objects. This pre-reflective state “contains no distinction between subject and 
object, but rather forms their foundation” (GS 19:161/SW I.339). For Dilthey, the separation that 
Descartes imposes between the self as a thinking thing and the world as physical thing is 
secondary to this prior unity and thus an artificial construction rather than a foundational one.  
 Moreover, unlike Descartes, Dilthey does not describe our relation to the world as 
subjects that stand over and against an external object. In The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality 
of the External World and Its Justification (1890), he argues that the world only becomes 
external to me when it resists me, which is not an intellectual relation but a tactile, bodily 
relation. Here Dilthey argues against Descartes’s concept of external objects as “projections of 
sensations into an outer visual or auditory space” (GS 5:106/SW II.24). Dilthey calls this concept 
of projection “superfluous” because the separation of self and world is secondary to our relation 
to the world and must be established through pre-reflective, embodied resistance. He explains 
how “a self begins to set itself apart from the objects within this spatial reality, as a body, as 
delineated and oriented in space” (GS 5:106/SW II.25). Whereas Descartes establishes a relation 
between the subject and world through the reflection of a transcendental ego or res cogitans, 
Dilthey sees the self as arising from immanent and embodied relations to the world. Accordingly, 
Dilthey’s use of the term Erlebnis conveys a very different sense of experience than Descartes. A 
lived experience is not a manifold of sensory data anchored by a transcendental ‘I.’ Instead, the 
term has existential and phenomenological connotations and conveys immersion in a world.  
 
 
1.2. Heidegger’s Shifting Use of Erlebnis and Erfahrung 
 
Early Heidegger adopts the term Erlebnis from Dilthey with similar concerns about how to 
approach the relational dynamism of experience. In his 1919 lecture course The Idea of 
Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview, a work thoroughly influenced by Dilthey, Heidegger 
uses Erlebnis in his discussion of the question “Is there something?” Here Heidegger addresses 
the phrase “there is . . .” (Es gibt, literally “it gives”). For Heidegger this question and the 
response to it are not purely intellectual or reflective. Rather, we experience the question as lived. 
He says, “The question is lived, is experienced [erlebt]. I experience. I experience something 
vitally” (GA 56:65/TDP 53). This early lecture course shows a preliminary account of what will 
become the question of being in Being and Time—namely, the question of why there is 
something rather than nothing. We experience the question in the sense that we live through it. 
The question strikes us. Erlebnis conveys the intensity of such an experience. This question of Es 
gibt as an experience, moreover, remains important throughout Heidegger’s corpus. In “Time 
and Being” (1962), Heidegger anchors his discussion of being and time in Es gibt. He notes that 
neither being nor time is a thing, meaning they do not exist like other things. Heidegger explains, 
“We do not say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is Being [Es gibt Sein] and there is time [es 
gibt Zeit]. . . . Instead of saying ‘it is,’ we say ‘there is,’ ‘It gives’” (GA 14:8–9/TB 4–5). Here 
Heidegger remarks that this phrase remains a mere idiom unless we “show how this ‘there is’ can 
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be experienced [erfahren] and seen” (GA 14:9/TB 5). In the Protokoll for “Time and Being,” 
Heidegger even points out how frequently he refers to ‘experience’ (Erfahrung) in the seminar. 
Heidegger explains this frequency by stating that the “awakening to Appropriation must be 
experienced [erfahren], it cannot be proven” (GA 14:63/TB 53). The strange and wondrous fact 
that there is something rather than nothing is not simply a statement—it is an experience. Despite 
using Erfahrung instead of Erlebnis, the late Heidegger emphasizes the experience of Es gibt, 
just as he did in his 1919 lecture course. More importantly, the shift from Erlebnis to Erfahrung 
from 1919 to 1962 is complicated, as the following will demonstrate. 
 In 1919 Heidegger describes Erfahrung as a distant and reflective form of experience, a 
“looked-at experience,” or a “de-vivifaction” of lived experience, an artificial construction that is 
secondary rather than foundational (GA 56:99/TDP 77). In this sense, Erfahrung adopts a 
Cartesian model of experience in which a subject stands apart from and looks at a separate, 
external world. Like Dilthey, Heidegger ascribes this de-vivified concept of experience to the 
natural sciences and their tendency to objectify and decontextualize: 
 
Science determines and fixes objects in an objective manner. A science of 
experiences would have to objectify experiences and thus strip away their non-
objective character as lived experience and event of appropriation. Already when 
I speak of two of my experiences I have objectified them: the one and the other, 
both are a something. For every experience that I want to consider I must isolate 
and lift out, break up and destroy the contexture of the experience so that in the 
end and despite all efforts to the contrary, I have only a heap of things. (GA 
56:76/TDP 60)    
 
Here the objective sense of Erfahrung conveys experience as discrete points of data abstracted 
from their context in opposition to the relational and dynamic sense of Erlebnis. Erfahrung treats 
the world as a set of objects that stand in relation to a subject, which is how Heidegger will 
characterize representational thought in the 1930s.  
 Like Dilthey, early Heidegger adopts the term Erlebnis to convey a living, dynamic sense 
of experience that is not centered on a Cartesian ego but instead the unity between the self and 
world. Heidegger states that there is no ‘I’ at the center of experience, but instead “only an ‘ex-
perience [Er-leben] of something,’ a ‘living towards something,’” which he describes in terms of 
comportment (GA 56:68/TDP 55). Here Heidegger’s account of experience is closer to Dilthey’s 
than Husserl’s.16 While Husserl’s concept of experience describes a pre-reflective relation 
through intentionality—the idea that consciousness is always consciousness of something—he 
still centers his account on a transcendental ego. By contrast, for Dilthey and Heidegger, we are 
always already thrown into a factical and historical world. The concrete, lived relations between 
the self and world form the foundation for experience. As Vallega-Neu describes, Heidegger 
decenters the human subject by showing how “in our concrete everyday ‘there-being,’ we are 
precisely not first and foremost with ourselves, encapsulated in some self-conscious ‘I-thing,’ but 
rather ‘out there,’ engaged by things, tasks, and others. Dasein is being-in-the-world and only 
from there comes back to itself when it becomes reflexively self-aware.”17  
 Heidegger retains this concept of experience as an open relation between the self and 
world in his later works. In “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), Heidegger describes being as 
that “which rises up and opens itself” and in doing so becomes present to those who open 
themselves to its presence (GA 5:90/OBT 68). In opposition to representational models that 
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conceptualize the subject of experience as determining beings, Heidegger instead claims that 
“man is the one who is looked upon by beings” (GA 5:91/OBT 68). This notion of experience 
describes a mutual relation, not unlike Heidegger’s derivation of phenomena from the verb 
phainesthai, which he explains is in the ‘middle voice,’ an ambiguous grammatical construction 
that is neither active nor passive voice (GA 2:28).18 The middle voice works against grammatical 
structures that identify a subject and object and instead establishes a reflexive relation. Along 
similar lines Heidegger’s undelivered lecture entitled “The Provenance of Thinking” (1973), 
which addresses the experience of thought, describes perception as a mutual relation between 
perceiver and perceived: “For perception to be able to be encountered at all by the perceivable, it 
must hold itself open. . . . Both perception as well as presencing require for their own 
possibility—and this means at the same time for their ‘to one another’—a free and open 
dimension, within which they encounter one another” (GA 15:402/FS 93). This statement 
suggests that perceptual experience is neither a subjective process nor the passive reception of an 
object, but an entangled, mutual opening up of self and world that allows an encounter to 
happen. Heidegger’s early use of Erlebnis thus describes the same dynamic as his later works.  
 The connection between Erlebnis and Ereignis in Heidegger’s 1919 lecture course also 
suggests potential threads of continuity, since Ereignis is significant throughout his entire 
corpus.19 In his 1919 lecture, Heidegger explains that a lived experience is “an event [Er-
eignis]—meaningful, not thing-like” (GA 56:69/TDP 56). This emphasis that Erlebnis is an 
event of appropriation conveys Heidegger’s intention to avoid a Cartesian ego that relates to an 
external world through representation. Heidegger explains that when he looks at something, like 
a lectern, it is not a physical object that he represents to himself, a transcendental ego, through a 
psychological process. That formulation is too abstract to convey the experience. Instead, the self 
“resonates with the experience” as an event of appropriation (GA 56:75/TDP 60). For Heidegger, 
the event of appropriation grounds lived experience such that there is neither a distinction 
between inner and outer, nor a res cogitans that serves as a foundation. Appropriation does not 
mean a process of internalizing something external. Instead, “experiences are events of 
appropriation in so far as they live out of one’s ‘own-ness,’ and life lives only in this way” (GA 
56:75/TDP 60). In this sense, Erlebnis conveys the vitality and dynamism of our relation to the 
world in a way that does not require a Cartesian concept of the ‘I.’ As Heidegger describes in his 
lecture course Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion (1920–21), “the experiencing self 
and what is experienced are not torn apart” (GA 60:9/PRL 7). For this reason, early Heidegger’s 
use of Erlebnis does not conflict with his later philosophical positions, even if his emphasis 
shifts. 
 At the same time that early Heidegger adopts Erlebnis in a way that is coherent with his 
later concept of Ereignis, he also expresses dissatisfaction with its connotations, which 
foreshadows his eventual rejection of it in favor of Erfahrung. It is important to note that 
Heidegger was ambivalent about the term from the outset. Even in 1919, Heidegger deplores that 
Erlebnis is “so faded and worn thin that, if it were not so fitting, it would be best to leave it 
aside” (GA 56:66/TDP 53). This observation is likely due to the popularity of Lebensphilosophie 
in post-WWI Germany.20 Like ‘life philosophy,’ ‘lived experience’ had such a popular, broad, 
and varied usage that it became emptied of any concrete meaning. Even though Heidegger uses 
Erlebnis during the period when he was engaged deeply with Dilthey’s thought, he was still 
suspicious of the hackneyed term, which had taken on new meanings since Dilthey’s death in 
1911. Moreover, when we examine his adoption of Erfahrung we see continuity with the 
concerns that led him to use Erlebnis in the first place despite his ambivalence toward it. 
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 By observing the difference between his 1919 lecture course The Idea of Philosophy and 
his 1919–20 lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology,21 we can see the exact moment 
Heidegger moves from Erlebnis to Erfahrung and the philosophical concerns that motivate this 
shift. In The Idea of Philosophy, Heidegger used Erlebnis to convey the toward-which that 
characterizes experience. This describes the relation between self and world that precedes the 
subject-object distinction, which mirrors Dilthey’s use of Erlebnis to convey lived experience as 
there-for-me. The toward-which of lived experience means that I am always already in a world. 
Yet just a semester later, Heidegger uses Erfahrung to convey the idea of experience as a 
“factical encountering” (GA 58:67/BPP 54). By factical encountering, Heidegger means that 
experience is not centered on the self of experience, but instead on the relation between self and 
world, a relation in which things strike us and move us. As Heidegger explains  
 
it is a fact that in our factical lives we—each one of us—encounters this and 
that, or that this and that encountering ‘befalls’ us, that we get to know this and 
that, which makes an impression on us. . . . We describe this as ‘ex-periencing’ 
[er-fahren], acquiring, meeting on the road [Fahrt] of life and doing so in 
various modifications of that in whose factical progression of a world, the 
environing-world and every life-world is constructed upon. (GA 58:67/BPP 54) 
 
Here Heidegger adopts Erfahrung in its Hegelian sense—that is, in the sense of going (fahren) or 
traveling always in relation to something. The more object-oriented connotation of Erfahrung 
allows Heidegger to shift the dynamic of experience more emphatically away from the subject. 
This shift from Erlebnis to Erfahrung conveys an attempt to find less subject-centered and more 
object-oriented language, which nevertheless does not depart from his earlier concerns. Instead, 
he transfers the meaning of one term to the other. It should also be noted that the idea of 
‘befalling’ in this passage expresses the same idea of experience that Heidegger maintains 
through his middle and late works. In “The Nature of Language” (1957), Heidegger explains, 
“When we talk of ‘undergoing’ an experience [Erfahrung], we mean specifically that the 
experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive 
it as it strikes us and submit to it” (GA 12:149/OWL 57). Not only does Heidegger begin to use 
Erfahrung in a way that is similar to his early use of Erlebnis, he shifts the meaning of Erlebnis 
in the direction of his previous critiques of Erfahrung by characterizing it as Cartesian.   
 In the 1930s, Heidegger’s use of Erlebnis undergoes a dramatic transformation and 
comes to stand for Cartesian subjectivity, representational thought, modern enframing (Gestell), 
and every mode of thinking that Heidegger wishes to overcome. Yet these critiques of Erlebnis 
do not contradict his previous conceptions of experience because they are based on a complete 
reconceptualization of the term. In Heidegger’s notebooks from 1936–38, Contributions to 
Philosophy (of the Event), Heidegger gives a very different definition of Erlebnis than he had in 
his 1919 lecture course. Heidegger states that Erlebnis is “the certainty of the ego,” which 
interprets all being through this I (GA 65:131/C 104). He explains, “What can count as actually 
‘being’ is only what is or can be the object of a lived experience . . . what humans can bring to 
themselves and before themselves” (GA 65:129/C 102). Here Heidegger describes Erlebnis as 
the culmination of metaphysics, which determines being according to the representational 
thought of the subject. He maps the progression of metaphysics beginning from Plato’s use of 
‘idea’ in the allegory of the cave to ‘constant presence,’ ‘representedness,’ and finally ‘lived 
experience’ (Erlebnis) (GA 65:130/C 102). Lived experience thus expresses the culmination of 
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the idea that the world and everything in it is the representation of a subject. Everything exists 
and is meaningful insofar as it can be experienced (erleben) by the subject. Heidegger expresses 
the same idea in “The Age of the World Picture” (1938). Modern thought no longer recognizes 
the being of beings and determines everything in relation to the subject, which turns the world 
into a mere representation or picture: “the world becomes a picture as soon as man makes his life 
as subject the primary center of reference. This means: the being counts as in being only to the 
degree and extent that it is taken into, and referred back to, this life, i.e., is lived out [erlebt], and 
becomes life-experience [Er-lebnis]” (GA 5:94/OBT 71). Heidegger’s use of Erlebnis in the 
1930s thus stands for the ego-centric dilemma of metaphysics and the violence of 
representational thought, instead of the broader notion of comportment, or living toward, from 
his early Freiburg lectures.   
 Heidegger’s Contributions undermine any positive notion of Erlebnis by connecting lived 
experience to machination (Machenschaft). For Heidegger, lived experience belongs to and 
verifies machination in modern thought. Machination is “the domination of making. . . . The 
pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything 
else equally and becomes completely alien to itself” (GA 65:131/C 92). Machination treats 
everything as something to be calculated, explained, and determined. Heidegger sees Erlebnis as 
yet another instance of the violence of thought, which imposes its own structures on things rather 
than being responsive to them. This relation between lived experience and machination becomes 
even more explicit in Heidegger’s critique of museum installations in Mindfulness (1938–39).22 
In this posthumously published journal written directly after Contributions, Heidegger describes 
the modern museum experience as a form of machination. A museum enframes (gestellen) works 
of art to calculate a specific response, which Heidegger calls “training-in-lived experience” (GA 
66:33/M 25). The works of art are presented as “liveable” so that they can be incorporated into 
the viewer’s own life and digested whole (GA 66:33/M 26). This treats the work of art as an 
object that is wholly determined by the subject and consumed without any remainder. Thus, not 
only does Heidegger reject Erlebnis, he seems to reject any aesthetic theory that is based on the 
idea of lived experience. In particular, Heidegger’s writings on art emphasize his adoption of 
Erfahrung and rejection to Erlebnis. During this shift, the object-oriented connotations of 
Erfahrung serve his attempt to reinterpret the thing in The Origin of the Work of Art (1935–36).  
By contrast, the more subject-centered connotations of Erlebnis become an impediment to his 
attempt to approach the work of art as ‘thingly,’ despite early Heidegger’s insistence that 
Erlebnis is not subject-centered.  
 Yet given the dramatically shifting meanings of the word Erlebnis in Heidegger’s 
philosophy, we see how his later critique of Erlebnis expresses the same concerns he had when 
he originally adopted the word. His early use of Erlebnis and later use of Erfahrung both 
emphasize the open, relational dynamism of experience. The change in language thus covers 
over continuity and reveals a more complicated story of his relation to Dilthey’s philosophy. 
Moreover, it should be noted that one of the motivating factors of Heidegger’s shift from 
Erlebnis to Erfahrung is to account for the facticity of experience, which he adopted from 
Dilthey, as the next section will explain.   
 Having complicated the common narrative of Heidegger’s break from Dilthey, the 
following sections will attempt to reconstruct a new understanding of how to read these thinkers 
in relation to each other, beginning with the concept of facticity and ending with the necessity of 
thinking the factical through art. 	
 




2. Facticity and the Problem of How to Philosophize about Experience 
 
Rather than examining Heidegger’s relation to Dilthey in terms of Erlebnis, a term which shifts 
in meaning too much to provide a clear indication of a break, I will develop an account of the 
appropriation through Dilthey’s formulation of facticity. As Scharff notes, Heidegger’s 
engagement with Dilthey centers on the idea of facticity: “in Dilthey the young Heidegger sees a 
pioneering effort to take seriously the idea that all thinking originates in and speaks out from its 
directly lived, factical situation.”23 Early Heidegger adopts Dilthey’s notion that the “standpoint 
of life” is the proper orientation of philosophizing as opposed to pure theoretical speculation. For 
both Dilthey and Heidegger, facticity presents the need for thought to be grounded in the 
concrete world rather than abstract formulas. Philosophy cannot simply proceed from universals 
to particulars or apply concepts and categories to experience.24 Philosophy must find a way to 
negotiate between the concrete particular and the broader categories of thought; a challenge that 
both Dilthey and Heidegger take up in terms of factical life.  
 
 
2.1. Dilthey’s Formulation of Facticity through Aesthetics 
 
For Dilthey, facticity describes what is given in lived experience, which we can never fully 
articulate or explain and thus calls for new modes of philosophical description.25 The ground for 
lived experience (Erlebnis) is life (Leben), which acts as a deep and inscrutable source whose 
depths we cannot fully unearth. In his unpublished notes, “Life and Cognition” (1892–93),26 
Dilthey states:  
 
 
The expression ‘life’ formulates what is most familiar and most intimate to 
everyone, yet at the same time something most obscure, indeed totally inscrutable. 
What life is remains an insoluble riddle. All reflection, inquiry, and thought arise 
from this inscrutable [source]. All cognition is rooted in this never fully 
cognizable [ground]. (GS 19:346/SW II.72) 
 
 
Dilthey sees life as an origin that we cannot fully reach. He explains, “no matter how hard I 
struggle to obtain the pure experience of the given, there is no such thing. The given lies beyond 
my direct experience” (GS 19:335/SW II.60). In this way, facticity points towards the 
underivability of the given, which means we cannot arrive at an understanding of lived 
experience through transcendental concepts or logical derivations. The source or ground for 
cognition is itself not completely cognizable and thus forms a limit. As Dilthey notes, “What life 
is cannot be expressed in a formula or be explained. For thought cannot go behind the very life 
from which it arises and in whose context it appears” (GS 19:347/SW II.72). As we are always 
within life, we can never get beyond it to analyze it from the outside. We are always caught up 
within it. There is no absolute perspective that can provide an a priori account because life 
always involves a context of concrete particularities and immanent relations.  
 Dilthey explains that the interconnections and coherence of life provide the ground for 
philosophy—not logical relations or rational concepts. He asserts that “connectedness in life 
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cannot be reduced to logical connections” (GS 19:347/SW II.73). This is not to say that Dilthey 
rejects logic and reason to assert a mystical vitalism. For Dilthey, “Thought can indeed shed light 
on life, but it cannot go behind life” (GS 19:357/SW II.83). Facticity limits our ability to grasp 
and analyze the given completely, yet this limit provides another possibility: description. In this 
way, “to ground thought is to go back to this process of life and describe it” (GS 19:344/SW 
II.69). For Dilthey, description takes a different approach to philosophy than metaphysics, which 
attempts to impose an artificial, rational order on the world. Dilthey explains, “Because 
metaphysics sought to conceptually comprehend the world, it was thinkable only under the 
presupposition that reason is primary and creative in the world and that concepts of reason are 
the forms of actuality” (GS 19:347/SW II.73). Yet this system of rationality limits philosophy 
because it fails to recognize the constraints it has imposed. The intellect is not the most 
foundational ground—life is. For Dilthey, the intellect is a “transient function that appears in life 
only at intervals” and yet “made itself into the principle of the entire universe” in order to treat 
reality as coextensive with categories (GS 19:348/SW II.73). Dilthey, however, argues the 
opposite. Life is the ground out of which philosophy grows and thought cannot go beyond it, nor 
can thought fully penetrate it. Instead, “life manifests an individual factuality, a haecceitas that 
the intellect cannot demonstrate to be necessary . . . the intellect cannot elucidate the singular 
traits of this small fragment of reality that lies before it” (GS 19:348/SW II.73). For this reason, 
philosophy must not attempt to dissect or abstractly conceptualize the facticity of life, but instead 
describe it and interpret how life articulates itself. In Dilthey’s philosophy, this need for 
interpretation means that philosophy must turn to art.   
 Art has a special status in Dilthey’s philosophy because of facticity,27 which he explicitly 
develops and frames in terms of art. In his Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics 
(1887), Dilthey describes facticity as a “surplus” and ascribes it to poetry as well as to life. 
“Facticity has always proved to be the ultimate fresh and firm nucleus of every poetic work. 
Therefore, a poetic work always contains more than can be expressed in a general proposition, 
and its gripping force comes precisely from this surplus” (GS 6:206/SW V.137). As a surplus, 
facticity cannot be subsumed into transcendental concepts or fit within a systematic framework. 
Reason lacks commensurable categories. The surplus of facticity describes not only the felt 
aspect of lived experience, but also its multi-faceted and contextualized nature. Factical life is 
excessive in the sense that it contains more than can be articulated or defined. Something unsaid 
always remains. The same is true of poetry. There cannot be a complete or final interpretation of 
a great poem. Poetic ambiguity allows for a plurality of meanings because what is central to the 
poem can take on new relations; its meaning is not fixed or determinate but fluid. Moreover, the 
poem says more than a simple proposition or idea because how it speaks is as important as what 
it says. Through rhythm, sound, imagery, and associations, the words of a poem take on greater 
significance than what they simply signify. For Dilthey the surplus of meaning in the poetic work 
evokes the surplus of factical life such that “a great poem is as irrational and incommensurable at 
its nucleus as the life that it portrays” (GS 6:217/SW V.149).  A great poem, like life, overflows 
with possible interpretations and meaning.  
 Not only does Dilthey develop the concept of facticity within his Poetics, he uses art and 
poetry to describe facticity in his philosophy of life. In “Life and Cognition,” his descriptions of 
facticity emphasize the need to approach it like music. He explains that life forms an “insoluble 
riddle” that resists formulas or static conceptualization and yet it “can be described. Its particular 
characteristic traits can be set in relief. One can trace, as it were, the accents and rhythms of the 
melody it arouses, but life cannot be analyzed into its factors. It is unanalyzable” (GS 19:346/SW 
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II.72). While the ground for lived experience cannot be analyzed in absolute terms, we can 
describe it like a melody. Dilthey thus rejects abstract conceptual analysis that presupposes a 
neutral perspective from the outside and instead develops a descriptive method that remains 
rooted in the standpoint of life—an approach to thinking that Dilthey characterizes as musical, 
rather than logical.28 In other words, we must treat life in its fullness of sense, feeling, and 
expression like a melody, rather than reduce it to an explanatory framework of formal categories. 
Like music, the qualitative and felt aspects as well as the temporality of lived experience elude 
abstraction.  
 In his unpublished notes “Fragments for a Poetics,” Dilthey describes the poet’s ability to 
understand life. Unlike other ways of seeing the world, the poetic attitude does not subordinate 
things to a goal or purpose.29 The poet is not engaged in a specific action that would interpret an 
event or object into a determinate framework that could restrict the meaning of life’s broader 
relations. Thus, for Dilthey the poet “apprehends the significance of life” (GS 6:319/SW V.230). 
As Dilthey explains, “In youth, life and poetic attitude coincide—life can still be spontaneous. 
Deliberate action forces life and poetic attitude to diverge. It is then that our poetic powers 
usually disappear” (GS 6:319/SW V.230). The poetic attitude describes the way of thinking that 
Dilthey finds necessary to approach life in its factical complexity and concreteness. We see this 
throughout these incomplete notes, since Dilthey’s revisions discuss not only aesthetic theory but 
also the need for “a different method” for approaching lived experience that “can lead us further” 
(GS 6:318/SW V.229). Dilthey sees the need to revise his approach to understanding life through 
a less direct method that does not force lived experience into determinate distinctions for the 
sake of clarity, but instead proceeds “through an intermediary” (GS 6:318/SW V.229). This 
intermediary between lived experience and understanding is expression—which becomes more 
vivid through art and literature in particular (GS 6:318/SW V.229).     
 Dilthey’s account of facticity thus sets up a descriptive method for approaching life that 
lends itself to aesthetics. Early Heidegger, however, approaches the challenges that factical life 
poses to philosophical concept-formation through phenomenology rather than aesthetics.  
 
 
2.2. Heidegger’s Adoption of Facticity from Dilthey 
 
Heidegger adopts the issue of factical life in his early Freiburg lectures (1919–23), the time 
period when he confronts Dilthey’s thought most rigorously. At this time, Heidegger’s 
philosophical questions revolve around the issue of how to philosophize from the perspective of 
factical life. Heidegger first uses the term in his 1920 lecture course Phenomenology of Intuition 
and Expression, where he discusses and defends Dilthey’s philosophy at length.30 While others 
are critical of the fact that Dilthey never provided a complete, systematic method of 
philosophizing, Heidegger states that this aspect of his thought was intentional since he 
questioned whether we could trace philosophical problems back to universal or unconditioned 
absolutes (GA 59:153/PIE 118). For Dilthey, the nature of history and lived experience is 
change, and life provides a limit that we cannot transcend. For these reasons, philosophy cannot 
attain the unconditioned conditions for experience and knowledge. Instead of seeking absolutes, 
Dilthey’s thought pursued the “ultimate philosophical motive: to interpret life from out of itself, 
primordially” (GA 59:154/PIE 119). Since life provides the ground and limit for thought, 
facticity describes the situation of our existence in terms of a constant interpretation and opening 
up of meanings. Here Heidegger’s definition of philosophy reflects this need for constant 
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interpretation in his description of ‘worrying.’ Heidegger characterizes the task of philosophy as 
“preserving the facticity of life and strengthening the facticity of Dasein” which requires “being 
worried in constant renewal” (GA 59:174/PIE 133). As Kisiel describes, facticity is “to be 
experienced not by taking cognizance of it, but by vital participation in it, being distressed by it, 
troubled and put out of ease, so that the troubled self who ‘minds’ or ‘cares’ is continually 
affected (betroffen) by this affliction.”31 According to Heidegger, this worrying about factical 
lived experience is the essential task of philosophy yet is “hushed up” by his contemporaries and 
thus “only possible on the basis of Diltheyian intuitions” (GA 59:174/PIE 133).  Dilthey opens 
up this possibility but does not achieve it and only offers “as perhaps every great philosopher, 
intimations: he sees a new reality but the expansion on what is seen is mostly never enacted” 
(GA 59:163–64/PIE 125–26). For Heidegger, Dilthey’s insights, though essential to the purpose 
of philosophy, are not fully realized and require a more radical approach.  
 Heidegger intends to further Dilthey’s “intimations” by delving into them through a 
phenomenological-critical destruction. Heidegger describes phenomenological destruction as 
necessary to prevent the return to things themselves from becoming “merely a retreat into one’s 
own common sense” (GA 59:30/PIE 21). Common sense is not primordial but instead 
generalized concepts formed from societal norms that have been adopted uncritically. Heidegger 
describes destruction as an attempt to go back to the primordial as historical, or the falling-away 
of life from what we can grasp through concepts (GA 59:37/PIE 26–27). For Heidegger, this 
form of destruction is essential to phenomenological method as “philosophy does not consist in 
deduced general definitions, but is always an element of factical life experience” (GA 59:36/PIE 
26). Like Dilthey, Heidegger sees philosophy as necessarily enacted in relation to factical life 
experience. Unlike Dilthey, Heidegger considers the task of interpreting life from out of itself to 
require an ontological approach that “question[s] towards the primordiality of the existence 
relation” (GA 59:38/PIE 27). While this 1920 lecture course set up Heidegger’s 
phenomenological destruction of Dilthey’s life-philosophy, his 1923 course Ontology: the 
Hermeneutics of Facticity enacts this method. In this lecture course we can see Heidegger’s 
appropriation of Dilthey in his treatment of factical life through ontology. Like Dilthey, 
Heidegger situates his consideration of factical life in terms of the distinction between the human 
sciences and natural sciences. Heidegger seems to criticize Dilthey’s life-philosophy due to his 
remarks about psychologism, yet these critiques are not aimed at Dilthey but at the same 
psychological methods that Dilthey opposes. Namely, Dilthey rejects explanatory approaches to 
psychology that creates abstract divisions and compartmentalizes the mind, rather than 
illuminating our existence. Like Dilthey, Heidegger proposes a new basis for human science, 
“not as a system of propositions and grounds for justifying them, but rather as something in 
which factical Dasein critically confronts itself and explicates itself” (GA 63:72/OHF 56). These 
words resonate with Diltheyian overtones and suggest Heidegger’s intention to adopt Dilthey’s 
philosophical project in his own terms.  
 Here Heidegger’s criticism that Dilthey did not adopt phenomenology is tempered by his 
critique of phenomenology. Heidegger notes several problems with the development of 
phenomenology: (1) it uncritically takes up traditional epistemological questions, (2) its 
distinctions are defined by the limits of logic, (3) it has a misguided drive for system—a 
tendency that Dilthey avoids by realizing that knowledge is always incomplete—and (4) it 
adopts traditional terminology that waters down its meaning (GA 63:71–72/OHF 56). 
Heidegger’s ontology is an attempt to overcome these limitations of phenomenology for the task 
of establishing the human sciences without a traditional, systematic epistemology. He shares 
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Dilthey’s task in reestablishing philosophy by breaking from traditional epistemology, yet does 
not fully acknowledge Dilthey’s role in his adoption of this task. Thus the path that 
“hermeneutics of facticity attempts to travel” is more connected to Dilthey than Heidegger 
conveys. 
 Like Dilthey, Heidegger sees life as the basis for philosophical inquiry and a challenge to 
philosophical methods that apply conceptual frameworks to lived experience. In Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology (1919), Heidegger calls phenomenology a primal science that addresses “life 
in and for itself” (GA 58:1/BPP 2). The goal of life-philosophy is thus to bring philosophy “to 
‘life’ . . . in an original and radical way” (GA 58:1/BPP 2). In Phenomenological Interpretations 
of Aristotle (1921), Heidegger calls life “a basic phenomenological category” and states that 
“life-philosophy is an actual attempt to come to philosophy rather than babble idly over 
academic frivolities” (GA 61:80/PIA 61). In his 1920–21 lecture course, Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Religion, Heidegger makes factical life fundamental by stating that “in it, the 
path to philosophy is made possible” (GA 60:11/PRL 8). Here he describes how philosophy’s 
tendency to move away from factical life requires a “turning around” toward factical life 
“through an authentic transformation” (GA 60:10/PRL 8). For this reason, Heidegger claims 
“Philosophy’s departure as well as its goal is factical life experience” (GA 60:15/PRL 11). Like 
Dilthey, Heidegger’s approach to facticity is not through concepts and universals, but through an 
attempt to understand the concrete contexts and relations of life. Heidegger describes facticity as 
what life is and “whereby it is, in its highest authenticity” (GA 61:87/PIA 66). He wants to 
transform philosophical thought by reorienting and connecting it more deeply to the dimensions 
of our experience that seem to defy abstract conceptualization.32 
 For Heidegger as for Dilthey, bringing philosophy to life and illuminating life through 
philosophy is not a simple matter. Philosophy must examine categories as they arise from 
experience—that is, as life articulates itself. Life has its own modes of access—namely, “life 
comes to itself” and philosophy cannot “pounce” on it from the outside (GA 61:88/PIA 66). Like 
Dilthey, Heidegger considers categories to be grounded in life and in need of articulation, rather 
than concepts that can be impressed on the raw data of sensory perception: “Categories are not 
inventions or a group of logical schemata . . . they are alive in life itself in an original way” (GA 
61:88/PIA 66).  For this reason, “Categories can be understood only insofar as factical life itself 
is compelled to interpretation” (GA 61:87/PIA 66). Interpretation, moreover, implies meaning. 
Heidegger explains, “In factical life, we always live in contexts of meaningfulness . . .  which 
speak to themselves in their own language. If we transfer ourselves into such experiences, vitally 
going along, then we notice that in the context of meaningfulness in which we live, we somehow 
have ourselves” (GA 58:250/BPP 188–89). Heidegger’s account of factical life emphasizes the 
meaningful contexts that form our lived experience, which echoes Dilthey’s account of facticity 
and Erlebnis. As Sheehan describes, facticity describes “the fact that we are always already 
engaged with the factum of meaning-giving, from which there is no escape.”33 
 In both Dilthey’s and Heidegger’s accounts of factical life the demand for philosophy 
remains the same. Namely, since factical life is not an object apart from us but rather something 
that involves us intimately, we are always already a part of that which we investigate. We cannot 
simply conceptualize life but must pursue it hermeneutically—in terms of moving from parts to 
the whole, interpreting life temporally through a narrative of the past, and recognizing the way 
we are always already entangled in the object of our investigation. For both thinkers, categories 
are not only articulated in terms of life but also must relate to life as a whole. Heidegger states 
that a “category is interpretive in relation to life in its entirety” (GA 61:89/PIA 67). For Dilthey 
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and Heidegger, this relation to the whole means that categories must be historical. That is, the 
temporal structure of factical life requires thinking life in terms of its historicity. In Introduction 
to the Phenomenology of Religion, Heidegger states that factical life is only intelligible “from the 
concept of the ‘historical’” (GA 60:9/PRL 7). The basic character of factical life becomes visible 
through memory.34 A hermeneutic approach to factical life thus adopts a mode of thinking that is 
grounded and immersed in what it attempts to understand. Like Dilthey, for Heidegger factical 
life defines the situation we find ourselves in:  constant self-interpretation. As Kisiel explains, 
“Because factic life experience is more than a cognitive experience, more than even the simple 
initial experience of taking cognizance, philosophy in the face of it must undergo a total 
transformation. What is had, lived, experienced in factic life experience is more than a mere 
object for a subject and its theory-forming activity, it is a world in which one can live. (One 
cannot live in an object).”35 This is why facticity requires, as Heidegger describes, “a peculiar 
turning around of philosophical comportment” insofar as factual life forms both its “departure” 
and its “goal” (GA 60:16/PRL 11).  
 Dilthey and Heidegger thus both use the concept of facticity to denote: (1) the felt, 
qualitative characteristics of lived experience, (2) its givenness in terms of the here and now—its 
thisness. Since life provides the ground and limit for factical lived experience, facticity 
emphasizes as well the (3) underivability of the given. Life is what is closest to us yet most 
difficult to understand. Moreover, as we are always within life,36 we can never get beyond it to 
analyze it from the outside. We are always caught up within it. Facticity thus describes the (4) 
entanglement of the self and world as a hermeneutic circle. That means that despite being 
“given” as a haecceitas, facticity is not immediate or self-evident, but always in need of 
interpretation. Unlike a fact that is analyzable and can be correct or incorrect, the factical asserts 
a deeper source to what is given in the present moment that cannot be fully unearthed. In this 
sense, facticity conveys (5) the inexhaustibility of a lived experience and the surplus of possible 
meanings that unfold from it. The feeling, haecceitas, underivability, hermeneutic entanglement, 
and inexhaustibility of facticity form the basis for Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey and, as I 
will argue in the following section, remain relevant throughout Heidegger’s philosophical 
development. 
 Unlike Dilthey, early Heidegger does not frame his approach to factical life within 
aesthetic theory. Yet as early as 1919, Heidegger connects factical life to art.37 In a 1919 summer 
semester course, Heidegger uses the artist and religious person as examples of “genuine life-
experiences” (GA 56:208/TDP 155).  In Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger 
describes van Gogh’s intense confrontation with his factical existence through his artistic work 
(GA 63:32/OHF 26–27). While he does not develop these connections in depth, his early thought 
provides some indication of why his later work privileges art. By the time Heidegger develops 
his philosophy of art, he no longer uses the term facticity. While facticity plays an important role 
in Heidegger’s thought up to Being and Time, he stops using the term almost completely after its 
publication.38 There are a few possible reasons for him abandoning this term. First of all, 
Heidegger could have grown increasingly concerned with distinguishing his philosophy from 
neo-Kantians like Natorp and Rickert, who approached facticity as an attempt to articulate 
transcendental conditions for absolute consciousness. Like Dilthey, for Heidegger facticity is not 
a matter of transcendental conditions for experience but, as Kisiel describes, “a primal reality 
ever to be experienced, the self in the actualization of life-experience.”39 In this sense, when 
facticity becomes a purely transcendental issue it loses its grip on experience. Another reason for 
Heidegger abandoning this term could be the rise of empiricism and positivism in the twentieth 
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century. The positivistic concept of ‘fact’ runs counter to Heidegger’s concerns because it 
exhibits a mode of representational thinking that cannot inquire into its conditions or 
situatedness.40 Facticity, unlike the empirical sense of ‘fact,’ attempts to articulate the complex 
dynamics by which something is given and yet never exhausted or completely determined. 
Lastly, French existentialism shifts the meaning of facticity in the 1940s. Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness (1943) and Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity (1947) reinterpret facticity (facticité) to 
describe the inescapable conditions of existence that oppose human freedom. While facticity is 
connected to Dasein’s thrownness in a world, Heidegger’s discussions are more concerned with 
lived experience and challenges to concept formation than issues of freedom.41 More 
importantly, Heidegger’s philosophy does not approach freedom in the same way as French 
existentialism due to his critique of Cartesian subjectivity. In these ways, the term facticity has a 
plurality of connotations and associations that do not necessarily serve Heidegger’s purposes. 
But he still deals with many of the same issues that facticity raises in his discussions of art—that 
is, feeling, haecceitas, underivability, interpretation, and surplus meaning.  
 In the following section, I will argue that this concern with facticity and the challenges it 
poses to concept-formation remain and take a new shape in Heidegger’s account of the work of 
art. Sheehan has shown how facticity remains significant through Heidegger’s thought. 
Specifically, he argues for continuity in Heidegger’s thought insofar as his early writings on 
facticity and later formulation of Ereignis (event of appropriation) both deal with the same 
questions of meaning and sense-making in terms of how the world is disclosed to us.42 I will 
draw similar parallels between the early and late Heidegger, but instead focus on the event of art 
as a new vocabulary for the hermeneutics of facticity. Here I will re-appropriate Dilthey—
specifically the relation between facticity and art—to show how Heidegger’s turn to art flows 
from, rather than against, his earlier philosophical investigations.    
   
 
3. Rethinking Facticity through Art  
 
While Dilthey explicitly draws connections between art and facticity, this relation is more 
implicit in Heidegger’s thought and harder to trace. Adding to this issue, it might seem 
counterintuitive to use Dilthey’s philosophy to understand Heidegger’s writings on art. On the 
surface, Heidegger sets up his approach to art and poetry against Erlebnis aesthetics.43 Heidegger 
argues that such aesthetic theory treats the work of art as a mere object of sensuous apprehension 
to be analyzed and summed up in terms of the subject’s lived experience. In his epilogue to The 
Origin of the Work of Art, he writes, “Lived experience [Erlebnis] is the source that is standard 
not only for art appreciation and enjoyment, but also for artistic creation. Everything is a lived 
experience. Yet perhaps lived experience is the element in which art dies” (GA 5:67/PLT 77).44 
With this approach to aesthetics, the work of art is valuable only insofar as it produces a 
particular experience in the spectator. Erlebnis aesthetics thus approaches the work of art as a 
product to be consumed. For Heidegger, art dies when it becomes something that can be 
exhausted in terms of a subjective experience and has no depth or force of its own. Yet, as 
established by tracing the shifting meanings of the Erlebnis-Erfahrung distinction earlier, 
Heidegger’s rejection of Erlebnis does not indicate a rejection of Dilthey’s philosophy. Rather, 
Heidegger trades Erlebnis for Erfahrung in an effort to convey the facticity of experience. I will 
argue that despite Heidegger’s critique of Erlebnis aesthetics, facticity still informs his approach 
to art and that this continuity demonstrates resonances with Dilthey’s aesthetics. In The Origin of 
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the Work of Art Heidegger describes works of art in a way that reflects Dilthey’s description of 
facticity as the qualitative and felt dimensions of experience that cannot be grasped through 
abstract concepts, as an underivable haecceitas that presents an inexhaustible surplus of 
meanings, and as the entanglement of self and world that calls for hermeneutic interpretation.  
 Heidegger begins The Origin of the Work of Art by pointing out that aesthetic theories 
focus so heavily on the conceptual meaning or symbolism of works of art that we fail to 
recognize this seemingly obvious and insignificant detail: that works of art are things, like other 
things in the world. For example, “Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs 
from the Black Forest. During the First World War Hölderlin’s hymns were packed in the 
soldier’s knapsack together with cleaning gear. Beethoven’s quartets lie in the storerooms of the 
publishing house like potatoes in a cellar” (GA 5:3/PLT 19). Works of art are material and are of 
this world, like other things in the world, and yet they are more. Unfortunately, as soon as we try 
to talk about “mere things”—things not defined by their usefulness—we are at a loss. In 
considering the history of the matter-form thing-concept and its prevalence in Western thought, 
Heidegger suggests that equipment has dominated how we think about things. Philosophy has 
treated things as equipment implicitly for so long that we no longer have any concept of a thing 
aside from its purpose. For Heidegger, however, works of art are significant not because they are 
physical vehicles for a spiritual meaning, but because they allow us to approach things in a more 
open way that is not limited by the concept of use. As exemplified in his description of van 
Gogh’s painting of shoes, the thing must be understood in terms of the many relations that form 
its context or its world as a whole, which requires a different comportment than when we engage 
with equipment. When we use a tool, it fades to the background and does not become 
conspicuous unless it breaks. By contrast, the work of art preserves the thing within the complex 
relations that form the world and makes the significance of these relations more vivid. Rather 
than abstracting from the sensible and felt qualities of experience by privileging ideas, art delves 
into their depth. Through art we become aware of ourselves as in a world, not simply detached 
spectators of things. Art thus turns us toward the facticity of things.  
 Art draws out the facticity of things insofar as they cannot be exhausted, which 
Heidegger describes in the dynamic between earth and world. For Heidegger, the work of art 
“sets up a world” and “holds open the Open of the world” (GA 5:31/PLT 44). The world opened 
by the work of art thus describes what manifests itself vividly to us. Every work of art discloses 
something by bringing it to light: “metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to 
sing, the word to speak” (GA 5:32/PLT 45). Art makes the world present itself as such—it makes 
the world world (die Welt welten). This phrase seems to convey Dilthey’s concept of Erlebnis as 
a heightened experience that makes the world more vivid.45 The work of art opens up a world, by 
thrusting the extraordinary to the surface and the familiar down (GA 5:54/PLT 64). Yet what is 
disclosed must come from somewhere, a deeper source that is not fully disclosed. Heidegger 
calls this source ‘earth.’ While the world describes the dynamic by which things are disclosed to 
us, the earth describes the source whereby things withdraw from us and elude our full 
understanding. As Heidegger describes, “Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze 
it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains 
undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it” (GA 
5:33/PLT 45). The dynamic between earth and world in the work of art is thus the strife between 
self-disclosure and self-seclusion. But Heidegger emphasizes that the earth and world are not 
separable, nor are their boundaries distinct: “The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts 
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through world” and their relation does not “wither away into the empty unity of opposites” (GA 
5:35/PLT 47).  
 Art in particular expresses this relation between earth and world—or between withdrawal 
and disclosure—because it allows the thing to remain hidden and unexplained. Art lets the thing 
rest in itself. For Heidegger 
 
 
the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does 
not use it up. . . . the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is 
not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also 
uses the word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to 
use them up, but rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and 
remains truly a word. (GA 5:34/PLT 46) 
 
 
The work of art, like facticity, draws our attention to the complex dynamics by which things are 
given to experience. What is most vivid in experience—its qualitative and felt aspects—resists 
explanation and cannot be exhausted. This relation between earth and world in the work of art 
describes the same dynamic that facticity brings to experience. With facticity, what is most 
familiar is furthest from our understanding. Art is not the symbolic representation of a reality that 
is set apart from us as subjects, but instead the disclosure of our factical entanglement with the 
world. In art we recognize the relations that make our being and the world inextricable from one 
another. We cannot sum up the meaning of a lived experience or arrive at final interpretation, but 
instead may always return to it to find new meanings. In the same sense, there is always more to 
be disclosed in a work of art. As Dilthey suggests, “the gripping force” of every work of art 
“comes precisely from this surplus” (GS 6:206/SW V.137).   
 Moreover, Heidegger’s description of the createdness of the work of art emphasizes its 
facticity in terms of haecceitas (thisness). For Heidegger, the creation of the work of art is not 
about the artist, material techniques, or circumstances that can explain how it came to be. 
Instead, “the simple ‘factum est’” of the work stands out (GA 5:52–53/PLT 63). We marvel that 
the work of art is, that it exists here and now, and “that such a work is at all rather than is not” 
(GA 5:53/PLT 63). The work of art is an event that provokes us to ask the question of being that 
Heidegger developed in The Idea of Philosophy and articulates more fully in Being and Time. In 
Being and Time, the broken tool can cause this sense of wonder because it interrupts us from our 
routine ways of being in ways that make us think about the nature of things. Yet the tool only 
does so when it breaks, unlike the work of art. In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger states 
that the factum est of tools “disappears in usefulness” and becomes a part of what is 
commonplace (GA 5:53/PLT 63). By contrast, the “more essentially the work opens itself, the 
more luminous becomes the uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not” (GA 5:53/PLT 
63). The work of art illuminates haecceitas in a way that other things cannot. Heidegger’s 
description of the significance of the work of art thus emphasizes its facticity. Facticity takes up 
the idea of a fact, something given in experience, but expands the sense of what is given. If the 
given is merely empirical data, it can be collected, analyzed, and determined in its entirety. 
Experience would be transparent, not interpretative. Facticity, however, recognizes that the 
incommensurability and un-derivability of the given—the simple “that it is” or es gibt that makes 
experience possible and at the same time cannot be grasped.  
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 In these ways, Heidegger’s turn to art after Being and Time expresses many of the same 
concerns as his earlier engagement with Dilthey and the problem of factical life. 
 
 
4. Reconsidering Heidegger’s Appropriation of Dilthey through Facticity & Art 
 
By connecting the work of art to facticity in Dilthey and Heidegger, I have constructed a new 
narrative of Heidegger’s relation to Dilthey—one that thinks beyond the narrow confines of 
explicit historical influence and instead compares similarities in concerns and general 
approaches. This new interpretation of the appropriation thus challenges the periodization of 
Heidegger’s thought and questions how scholars have placed Dilthey in the history of German 
philosophy.46 Heidegger’s thought clearly diverges from his early engagement with Dilthey and 
develops new insights and ways of thinking. Yet Heidegger’s relation to Dilthey was always 
complicated and does not take a linear path from adoption to rejection. From the beginning, 
Heidegger described appropriation as a critical adoption, or Destruktion,47 that carries forward 
the unseen potential of an idea. With this sense, Heidegger’s appropriation takes up and carries 
forward Dilthey’s insights beyond the possibilities that he saw for his own thought. We do not 
have to read critiques of Dilthey as indications of rejection.  
 At the same time I have attempted to reverse the appropriation by reading Heidegger 
through Dilthey to show how his turn to art might be understood through his earlier concerns 
with facticity. Since Dilthey develops his account of facticity in terms of art and poetry, his 
aesthetics helps us to see greater coherence in Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole.48   
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1 This term was coined by Theodore Kisiel in The Genesis of Being and Time. For details about 
the manuscript, its revisions, and its various transformations that led to the publication of Being 
and Time see Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, especially ch. 7, “The Dilthey Draft: ‘The 
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, 455.  
3 Even when Heidegger does not reference Dilthey directly, he frequently adopts Dilthey’s 
language, distinctions, and methods. The following lecture courses indicate the depth of 
Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey, particularly in terms of facticity: Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (1919–20), Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression (1920), Introduction to 
the Phenomenology of Religion (1920–21), Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: 
Initiation into Phenomenological Research (1921–22), and Ontology: the Hermeneutics of 
Facticity (1923). Additionally, Dilthey’s influence on Heidegger can be detected in Heidegger’s 
introduction to a book on Aristotle that was never completed, “Phenomenological Interpretations 
in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation” (1922).  
4 Robert Scharff, “Heidegger’s ‘Appropriation,’” 127. In his most recent book, Heidegger 
Becoming Phenomenological, Scharff provides a detailed account of how Heidegger develops 
his phenomenological method from Dilthey to critique Husserl’s ahistorical, transcendental 
approach. 
5 For an overview of Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey’s philosophy of worldviews see Eric 
Nelson, “World Picture and its Conflict.” Nelson demonstrates that Heidegger conflates the 
plurality of worldviews that Dilthey discusses into one type of worldview—naturalism—which 
is objectivistic. Heidegger thus misinterprets Dilthey’s philosophy of worldviews. Heidegger 
also mischaracterizes Dilthey’s rejection of metaphysics. Charles Bambach describes Dilthey’s 
anti-metaphysical position not as a way of adopting a Cartesian epistemology but as a critique of 
Hegel and the idea that philosophy can posit an absolute ideal. See Bambach, Crisis of 
Historicism, 136–37. 
6 All of Heidegger’s works are abbreviated according to the volume of the Gesamtausgabe [GA] 
followed by the page number of the original German then the page number of the English 
translation.  
7 Translated in English as Ponderings II–VI.  
8 Rudolf Makkreel explains Heidegger’s misinterpretation of Dilthey’s epistemology, especially 
in terms of anthropological description, in Orientation and Judgment, 29–33. While Heidegger 
sees Dilthey as unable to understand the ontological analyses of temporality due to his critiques 
of metaphysics and use of anthropology, Makkreel argues that Dilthey’s anthropological 
reflections go beyond ontic time and draw out ontological implications that Heidegger ignores.      
9 For more historical background on this distinction see Martin Jay, Songs of Experience, 11–12.  
10 Makkreel, Dilthey, 8.  
11 Makkreel, Dilthey, 8.  
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12 All of Dilthey’s works are abbreviated according to the volume of his Gesammelte Schriften 
[GS] with the page number of the original German, followed by the English translation from the 
volumes of Selected Works [SW], edited by Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. 
13 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 56.  
14 See James Reid’s explanation of how Gadamer misinterprets Dilthey in “Dilthey’s 
Epistemology.” 
15 This translation of Innewerden is established by Makkreel and Rodi to describe the reflexivity 
of awareness before reflection separates subject and object. The German translates to “becoming 
aware” (Innewerden), but does not convey the reflexivity or self-givenness that Dilthey describes 
in this pre-reflective state. See editors’ introduction to SW I.  
16 For more on Heidegger’s revision of Husserlian intentionality and phenomenological method 
through Dilthey, see John van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 214–16, and Scharff, Heidegger 
Becoming Phenomenological, chapter 5.   
17 Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Poietic Writings, 3. 
18 See Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Poietic Writings, 4–5.  
19 The use of Ereignis here is distinct from his later development in Contributions (GA 65) and 
The Event (GA 71).  
20 See Jeffrey Andrew Barash, Problem of Historical Meaning, 160.  
21 Not to be confused with his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 
24). 
22 For a longer account of Heidegger’s critique of Erlebnis in Contributions to Philosophy and 
Mindfulness see Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Poietic Writings. 
23 Scharff, “Heidegger’s ‘Appropriation,’” 112. 
24 This challenge of how to philosophize also relates to formal indication. Scharff connects 
Heidegger’s formal indication—which attempts to “steer us away from all the traditional 
misconceptions, distortions, and selective representations of phenomena, and precisely in the 
process of doing this, also guide us toward a transformative perception of how phenomena are 
there-for and given-to us in their own being”—to Dilthey’s philosophy (“Becoming a 
Philosopher,” 135.) See also, Kisiel, “Hermeneutics of Facticity,” and Daniel Dahlstrom, 
Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, especially ch. 4.  
25 Nelson notes that this term is used very broadly in Dilthey’s philosophy and can mean: “(1) 
the singularity and multiplicity of historical facticity, which defy theoretical comprehension into 
a systematic totality and require the infinite work of description and interpretation; (2) the 
givenness of positive factuality which is the basis, object, and potential limiting condition and 
other of rational and scientific inquiry” (“Empiricism, Facticity,” 113.) These two senses are 
connected to the historicity of experience, which shapes the given.    
26 Dilthey later incorporated these notes that outline the idea of factical life in Book V of 
Introduction to the Human Sciences, which was a general plan for a later work, The Formation of 
the Historical World (SW III). 
27 Makkreel has argued that Dilthey’s aesthetic theory does not simply exemplify his theory of 
the Geisteswissenschaften; his aesthetics transforms his way of philosophizing, especially insofar 
as his inquiries into art allows him to reformulate and refine his philosophical approach 
throughout his career. See Makkreel, Dilthey, 15–17. Perhaps the best example of Dilthey 
rethinking experience through art is “Fragments for a Poetics” (1907–1908), where he 
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reconceptualizes temporal experience through poetry. For a longer explanation, see my article 
“Heidegger and the Poetics of Time,” 136–37.    
28 For more on Dilthey’s use of music as a paradigm for understanding life, see Michael Batz, 
Der Rhythmus des Lebens; Anne O’Byrne, Natality and Finitude, 57–59; and Rodi, Das 
strukturierte Ganze, 133–50.  
29 For another account of Dilthey’s elevation of art as a way to grasp what is essential about life, 
see Kurt Müller-Vollmer, Dilthey’s Poetik, especially pages 136–45.  
30 Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, 136.  
31 Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, 136.  
32 As Scott Campbell explains, facticity concerns “those dimensions of human experience by 
which human beings are able to understand themselves… not looking on at life but participating 
in it, and so living” (The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life, 2.) See Campbell’s book for a 
longer treatment of factical life in early Heidegger, especially the connection between facticity 
and religious life.  
33 Thomas Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” 61. 
34 David Carr discusses the idea of meaning in Dilthey’s description of the temporal structure of 
lived experience as Zusammenhang, or coherence, in terms of narrative. See Carr, Time, 
Narrative, and History, chapter 3, “The Self and the Coherence of Life.”  
35 Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, 134. 
36 See Jacob Owensby, “Dilthey’s Conception of the Life-Nexus.”  
37 In the editor’s introduction to GA 56, van Buren provides a brief overview of early 
Heidegger’s engagement with art and literature.   
38 Heidegger has a note about the “’time-space’ and ‘facticity’ of Dasein” in Contributions that is 
worth further consideration (GA 65:371/C 293).  
39 For more on the differences between the neo-Kantians’ and Heidegger’s formulations of 
facticity, see Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, 136–37.  
40 See Heidegger’s WS 1935–36 lecture course, The Question Concerning the Thing: Kant’s 
Doctrine of Transcendental Principles. 
41 Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” 61.  
42 Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” 42.  
43 See also Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” where Heidegger argues against 
the idea that poetry can be understood as an expression of Erlebnis, 26–28. In Hölderlin’s Hymn 
“The Ister,” Heidegger states that tragedy belongs to the truth of being and should not be 
approached as a psychological Erlebnis. In these passages it is not clear if Heidegger means to 
critique Dilthey or his followers like Spengler, since the early Heidegger’s appropriation of 
Dilthey was meant to rescue his philosophical insights from reductive or simplistic adoptions of 
his work.  
44 I have edited Hofstadter’s translation here, since he translates Erlebnis as “experience” instead 
of “lived experience.” 
45 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
46 Van Buren critiques the periodization of Heidegger’s corpus for overlooking his early thought 
and for simplifying a very complex, non-linear path of thought, whose twists and turns not even 
Heidegger could describe adequately. See The Young Heidegger, esp. 5–9, 19.  
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47 As Bambach explains, Heidegger’s concept of Destruktion is not violent or forceful but 
instead a type of dismantling meant to allow “a free viewing of things as they show themselves 
in themselves” (“Phenomenological Research as Destruktion,” 118.) 
48 Thank you to Rudolf Makkreel and Robert Scharff for encouraging this project and discussing 
it in its early stages. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful 
engagement with my work and insightful feedback.  
